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The politics of ageing: health consumers, markets and hegemonic challenge 
 
Introduction 
Writing in The Times two days after the UK’s EU Referendum and the Leave victory, the 
columnist and Remain supporter Giles Coren (48) said,  
 
The wrinkly bastards stitched us young ‘uns up good and proper on Thursday.  From 
their stairlifts and their zimmer frames, their electric recliner beds and their walk-in 
baths, they reached out with their wizened old writing hands to make their wobbly 
crosses and screwed their children and their children’s children for a thousand 
generations (Coren 2016: 28). 
 
In recent years ageing has travelled from the placid backwaters of politics into the 
mainstream of policy debate.  Accompanying that voyage has been a steady increase in the 
visibility of age-related issues such as intergenerational justice, age discrimination, the 
power of the ‘grey pound’ and ‘grey vote’, pension and mortgage market changes, and, 
inevitably, NHS costs.  Debates surrounding ageing regularly span the social, the economic 
and the political, on the one hand, and a range of age groups, on the other.  New narratives 
of ageing have emerged with the language of ‘opportunity’ and ‘potential’ challenging the 
traditional discourse of ‘decline’ and ‘deficit’ expressed so viscerally by Coren. 
 
How and why has this happened?  What are the forces that have politicised ageing across 
such various dimensions, creating a sustained opposition to the established institutions 
which, historically, have constructed, propagated and legitimised our understanding of 
ageing? In addressing these questions this paper applies an analysis drawing on the work of 
Gramsci as a platform for the exploration of the engagement between the hegemonic and 
counter-hegemonic dynamics of ageing.  Ageing is seen as a political terrain where there is a 
continuing struggle for advantage between traditional and emergent forms of power.  What 
was once a peaceful territory dominated by a hegemonic view of ageing as an inevitable 
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process of biological, economic and cultural decline has become one characterised by 
tensions and contest. Whilst accepting there is a foundational aspect to ageing that 
embodies physical disability and ultimately death (Gilleard & Higgs, 2000),  alternative, 
positive interpretations of the life course and the transitions it embodies have challenged 
both the hegemonic ideology of ageing itself and its economic and institutional 
infrastructure. 
 
Whilst accepting Gramci’s view regarding the importance of the economic base in shaping 
the sources of hegemonic challenge, the paper expands that perspective to include the 
potentially disruptive power of consumers and markets.  Rather than markets being 
assumed to be an integral part of a hegemony supportive of a particular power alliance, the 
issue is left open: some markets will be but some may not.  Consumers may choose to 
express their demand outside the borders of the hegemonic markets and new markets may 
emerge in response to, or anticipation of, this demand.  Individuals acting in concert 
through the mechanisms of the market, and not institutionalised modes of opposition, may 
become the agents of hegemonic challenge. The causal primacy of the economic base is 
thus retained, but not in the form Gramsci would have construed it.  At the same time, 
rather than viewing it as a quality attached to particular groups in the chronology of life, 
ageing is seen as a continuum of movement over time through changing social and 
economic contexts where politicisation of ageing may occur.   
 
The paper begins by elaborating a Gramscian approach to the politics of ageing and 
progressively applies it to the institutions, ideology and modus operandi of the hegemony 
itself.   What power interests are served by the hegemony, how does it work, and what 
tensions does it embody?  Second, the rise of the counter-hegemony of ageing is analysed 
focusing in particular on the political and ideological implications of market power and 
consumer choice. In what ways do market-based forms of consumer power challenge the 
hegemony of ageing through the operation of disruptive capitalism?  What new forms of 
social relations does the counter-hegemony generate and to what extent are they 






Hegemony and ageing 
In its traditional form, the hegemony of ageing presents the latter stages of the life course 
as a journey of decline where the loss of economic, social and cultural value is the inevitable 
individual experience.  Who benefits from this view?  Driving any hegemony is what Gramsci 
terms the blocco storico, the historic block, acting to construct and justify its power.  More 
than simply a political alliance between social forces, the blocco storico integrates and 
propagates a set of interests ‘bringing about not only a unison of economic and political 
aims, but also intellectual and moral unity … on a “universal” plane’ (Gramsci, 1971: 181-2). 
This unity is achieved through the propagation of an ideology and the maintenance of a 
cultural hegemony expressed in terms of: ‘Consent given by the great masses of the 
population to the general direction imposed on social life by the dominant fundamental  
group; this consent is “historically” caused by the prestige  (and consequent confidence) 
which the dominant group enjoys because of its position and function in the world of 
production.’ (Gramsci, 1971: 145)  In order to acquire and maintain the consent of their 
subject population through ideological domination, hegemonies ‘must propose a set of 
descriptions of the world, and the values that preside over it, that become in large measure 
internalised by those under its sway’ (Anderson, 2017: 21).  In its most developed form, 
hegemony creates ‘an order in which a certain way of life and thought is dominant, in which 
one concept of reality is diffused throughout society in all its institutional and private 
manifestations, informing with its spirit all taste, morality, customs, religious and political 
principles, and all social relations, particularly in their intellectual and moral connotation ’ 
(Williams, 1960, 587).  In other words, ‘hegemony is soft power, the ability to make others 
want the same thing as yourself, as distinct from hard power, the ability to force others to 
give you what you want’ (Wade, 2002, 216). 
 
In the case of ageing, this paper argues that the historic block is composed of the 
pharmaceutical industry, the medical profession and the state.  Through an established and 
interlinked network of institutions described in detail in work on the ‘health care state’ in 
the United Kingdom (UK) (Moran, 1999) and the medical-industrial complex in the United 
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States (US) (Estes, 1986; Relman, 1980; Wohl, 1984), the block works to control the health 
care market, its supporting system of social relations and the values necessary to maintain 
the hegemonic distribution of benefits and power to the block members.  As Estes has 
elaborated, these members combine to constitute the ‘ageing enterprise’ composed of the 
‘programmes, organisations, bureaucracies, interest groups, trade associations, providers, 
industries, and professionals that serve the aged in one capacity or another’ (Estes, 1979: 2).  
Essentially the block is a supply-side hegemony, working to maintain a view of ageing that 
will generate a predictable and increasing health care demand to service the current and 
future supply from its economic base, the pharmaceuticals.  Earlier research on the political 
economy of ageing emphasised the labour market dimension of the economic base in terms 
of the exclusion of older people from employment through the social process of retirement, 
their redefinition as ‘old age pensioners’ in terms of income, and their labelling as ‘old and 
needy’ in terms of social policy (Phillipson, 1982; Walker, 1981).  Poverty and dependence 
were seen to be a necessary consequence of that subordination to the requirement of the 
capitalist economy for a flexible pool of labour (Phillipson, 1998; Walker, 1980).  In this 
paper the emphasis is much more on the dynamic of the pharmaceutical industry where 
older people are still conceived of as ‘old and needy’ in order to stimulate and justify 
demand for drugs but, importantly, may also be active pharmaceutical consumers 
responding to that demand with income generated through employment.  In this context 
the needs of the labour market are less important than the need of the pharmaceutical 




In global terms, the success of the hegemony is evident in the continuing expansion of its 
economic base.  By 2018, world spending on medicines is forecast to reach nearly $1.3 
trillion, an increase of about 30% over the 2013 level representing a compound annual 
growth rate of 4.7% on a constant currency basis.  Whilst the developed markets of the 
United States, Europe and Japan are currently the primary drivers of this growth, the global 
reach of the hegemony is reflected in the predicted pharmaceutical market growth of 
emerging economies such as China and India of 8-11% up to 2018 (IMS Institute of 
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Healthcare Informatics, 2014, 1).  Between 1972 and 2005 the global drugs bill increased 
thirty fold (Law 2006).  In England alone, the dispensing of prescription drugs has increased 
by almost 60% in the past ten years, with the average annual number of prescription items 
per head rising from 13 in 2003 to 19 in 2013 (Health and Social Care information Centre, 
2014a).  The Health Survey for England 2013 reported that 43% of men and 50% of women 
had taken at least one prescribed medicine in the last week (Health and Social Care 
Information Centre 2014b: 11).  Importantly, as age increases so does drug consumption, in 
part as a result of increasing co-morbidities.  Research in England on polypharmacy (five or 
more drugs simultaneously prescribed) showed it to be clearly age-related.  For example, 
between 1995 and 2010 the proportion of people aged 65 and over who were dispensed 5 
or more drugs increased from 11.4% to 20.8% (Guthrie et al, 3).  Similarly in the US, 
between 1988–1994 and 2013–2014, the percent of adults reporting the use of five or more 
prescription drugs in the past 30 days rose - by 2.7% for adults aged 18–44, 12.8% for adults 
aged 45–64, and 28.4% for adults aged 65 and over (National Centre for Health Statistics, 
2016: 25).  The case of statins to reduce cholesterol in older people is particularly illustrative 
of this trend with UK prescriptions for Atorvastatin rising 42% from 12.8 million items in 
2012 to 18.2 million items in 2013 (Health and Social Care Information Centre, 2014a).  A 
table from the Health Survey for England 2013 provides a graphic portrayal of the overall 
age-drug consumption relationship (Table 1) (Health and Social Care Information Centre 
























These are impressive figures, reflecting the fact that the drug industry is one of the world’s 
largest.  How does the hegemony act to sustain the dominant position of its economic base 
over time, consistently seeking to shape consumer demand through the construction of 
appropriate social relations of production?  Williams et al have charted what they term the 
‘pharmaceuticalisation of society’ characterised by ‘the translation or transformation of 
human conditions, capabilities and capacities into opportunities for pharmaceutical 
intervention’ (Williams et al, 2011, 711).  It is presented as a process which is value-neutral, 
‘may include both gains and losses to society’ and be partial or complete (Williams et al, 
2011: 719). Pharmaceuticals are seen as engaging in the ‘corporate construction of disease’, 
where the ambition is to turn ordinary ailments into medical problems, presenting mild 
symptoms as serious, treating personal problems as medical and risks as diseases 
(Moynihan, 2002).  In its constant search for new consumer markets, the industry promotes 
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the utility of biomedical enhancement through its advancement of socially expected 
standards of normality, bodily augmentation and rejuvenation (Conrad, 2007, 87-9; Salter, 
Howe, McDaid et al, 2011:809).  Ultimately its goal is what Fox and Ward describe as ‘the 
pharmaceuticalisation of everyday life’ where drugs become the accepted answer to the 
common problems of daily living (Fox and Ward, 2009).  In this perhaps not so distant future 
where everyday life has been ‘colonised by pharmaceutical solutions’ (Williams et al, 2009, 
721), the hegemonic capture of consumer demand would then be complete.   
 
The extent to which such market dominance is either achievable or sustainable rests not just 
on the efforts of the pharmaceutical industry but on the ability of the blocco storico as a 
whole to support and legitimise the evolving nature of its economic base.   As Williams et al 
note, ‘there are important sources of resistance to the expansion of pharmaceutical markets 
from the media, government, medicine, patients and diverse publics’ (Williams et al, 2011: 
722).  It is therefore important that medicine and the state combine to foster the social 
relations congruent with the operation of the hegemonic pharmaceutical market.  Medical 
authority, firstly, has traditionally been employed to control and structure consumer 
demand for health treatment by defining it in terms of ‘clinical need’.  At the same time, in 
acting as the gatekeeper to medicines the profession is naturally interested in expanding its 
own territory as well as that of the pharmaceutical industry (Busfield, 2010).  Often working 
in tandem with the latter, medicine pursues its own path of what has been termed 
‘medicalisation’ characterised by ‘defining a problem in medical terms, usually an illness or 
disorder, or using a medical intervention to prevent it’ (Conrad, 2005: 3; see also Ballard and 
Elston, 2005).  For example, problem gambling has recently been defined as an addiction 
requiring pharmaceutical treatment (Ellison, 2016).  As with pharmaceuticalisation, ‘in the 
sea of medicalisation there are some islands of resistance....such as homosexuality and 
disability [which] politicise the issue and make it part of the agenda of a social movement’ 
(Conrad, 2007: 161).  Nonetheless, in general medicalisation allows the profession to use its 
power of diagnosis as the means for massaging and justifying new patient expectations and, 
as a result, fresh consumer demand for pharmaceutical products.  In so doing the profession 
is enabling a hegemonic infrastructure of production which ‘covers the production and 
reproduction of knowledge and of the social relations, morals and institutions that are 
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prerequisites to the production of physical goods’ (Cox, 1987, 4) – in this case 
pharmaceutical goods.  Medicalisation and pharmaceuticalisation can thus be seen as 
complementary functions carried out to their mutual benefit by two partners of the historic 
bloc.  For the health consumer, the implication of the partnership is that individual 
consumer choices are not only framed by the drug industry and guided by medical expertise 
but also made in the context of hegemonic social values propagated by the partnership.  As 
Dew et al have shown, self-governance in the use of drugs is subject to the pervasive, but 
not necessarily effective pressure of hegemonic moral discourses to which consumers may 
or may not be resistant depending, as we shall see later, on their ability to draw on 
alternative discourses embodying a counter-hegemonic form of demand (Dew et al, 2015).   
 
With the pharmaceutical industry and medical profession allied through their management 
of a mutually beneficial hegemonic market, an important political task of the third partner in 
the blocco storico, the state, is the institutional facilitation of this particular form of 
production.  In his work on the health care state, Moran charts the ‘interpenetration of the 
institutions of the state and the institutions of the health care system’ and shows how the 
resources of the democratic state offer the medical profession the opportunity to gain 
competitive advantage in healthcare markets by securing preferential policy outcomes i n, 
for example, the implementation of restrictive practices (Moran, 1999, 10, 14).  It is not a 
one-way transfer of benefits.  Salter’s research documents how the medicine-state 
concordat provides medicine with the institutions of self-regulation, status and power and 
the state with a key mechanism in the political management of the health service: the 
rationing by the medical profession of the health service demand generated by citizens’ 
health care rights, (Salter, 2004).  Like most partnerships it has periods when tensions and 
disagreements come to the fore: for example, the extended dispute in 2016 over junior 
doctor contracts.  But the institutional arrangements governing the medicine -state 
relationship remain unchallenged and ensure that the negotiation of the exchange of 





For the pharmaceutical-state relationship this takes the form of a common interest in the 
economic health of the industry.  A key institutional role in the alliance is that of the 
regulatory agency.  Commonly funded by the industry itself, in the main as a result of the 
neo-liberal impulse which influenced many Western modes of governance from the 1980s 
onwards, and legally sanctioned by the state, the agency is tasked with balancing the needs 
of public health with those of the industry.  The hegemonic imperative to maintain and 
increase pharmaceutical consumption renders this a difficult task.  Research has revealed 
evidence of a corporate bias and privileged access by pharmaceutical companies to 
regulatory bodies such as the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) in the USA and the 
Medicine and Health Care Products Regulatory Agency (MHRA) in the UK amounting to a 
‘regulatory capture’ likely to diminish the weight given to the public health interest 
(Abraham 2009a; Abraham and Lewis, 2002).  Policies designed to facilitate the arrival of 
new products on the market have produced significant reductions in the regulatory review 
times for new patentable drugs, reducing them by half in the USA since 1993 with similar 
falls evident in Europe (Abraham 2009b: 60).  Internationally, agencies compete with one 
another to produce modes of regulation that can generate faster and more efficient drug 
innovation as they respond to the pressures of the global pharmaceutical market, thus 
locking them into the pharmaceutical-state section of the hegemony (Williams et al, 2011: 
714). 
 
Ideology and legitimation 
The sustainability of the hegemony through the activities of the blocco storico is dependent 
not only on the interwoven interests and institutions of its constituent partners but als o the 
propagation of a belief system capable of legitimising that arrangement as an expression of 
the economic base.  Gramsci is clear about the interdependence of base and superstructure 
arguing that ‘the material forces would be inconceivable historically without form and 
ideologies would be individual fancies without the material forces’  (Gramsci, 1971: 377).  
Their synthesis is achieved, he maintains, by ‘widening a theory of the state to include 
relations within civil society’ in order to understand the way in which hegemony acts to 
generate consent (Beiler and Morton, 2003).  By extending the concept of the state beyond 
the formal apparatus of government to include important elements of the private sphere of 
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society, Gramsci provides the analytical path for showing how the historic bloc acts to 
universalise the norms and values consistent with its economic base , bringing together state 
power and the underlying configurations of social forces (Germain and Kenny (1998: 15).   
How does this process work in the hegemony of ageing?  
 
Pharmaceuticalised ageing is a central feature of the hegemony’s economic base: increased 
age brings increased drug consumption.  To sustain this market characteristic, consumer 
demand is controlled through an ideological narrative of  decline.  What the World Health 
Organisation (WHO) has described as ‘deficit conceptualisations’ of ageing present it as 
characterised by increasing vulnerability, exposure to risk and social disengagement (WHO, 
2015: 8).  Such ‘ageism’ has been defined by Bytheway and Johnson as , 
 
a set of beliefs ... relating to the ageing process. Ageism generates and reinforces a 
fear and denigration of the ageing process, and stereotyping presumptions regarding 
competence and the need for protection. In particular, ageism legitimates the use of 
chronological age to mark out classes of people who are systematically denied 
resources and opportunities that others enjoy, and who suffer the consequences of 
such denigration, ranging from well‐meaning patronage to unambiguous vilification 
(Bytheway and Johnson 1990: 28). 
 
The prevalence of the ideology is evident in the extent to which it is ingrained in social views 
of ageing.  Negative ageist attitudes are widely held and not confined to one social or ethni c 
group (Kite and Wagner, 2002). As one would expect within an effective hegemony, such 
ageism is regarded as legitimate and, in Allen’s view, ‘is one of the most socially condoned 
and institutionalised forms of prejudice....generally considered normative and acceptable’ , 
unlike, say, racism and sexism (Allen, 2015). 
 
The impact of the decline ideology is evident at the micro-level of individual reality, the 
mesa-levels of the Health Service and biomedical research and the macro-level of policy.  
From this perspective, as people age so they are more likely to be  ‘not healthy’, ‘ill’ and 
deviant, with a consequent reduction in their social value (Dew et al, 2015: 272).  As the 
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WHO observes ‘decline and increasing irrelevance appear inevitable, and decision-makers 
focus on the “care of the elderly” and fret over what is portrayed as dependence and 
increasing demands for health care, pensions and social services’ (WHO 2015: 8). 
Retirement is taken to symbolise a more general process of social withdrawal and gradual 
shedding of social identity that necessarily accompanies ageing (Gilleard and Higgs 2000: 
32).  With withdrawal comes a dependency structured and institutionalised by the state: 
individuals are seen to have a social deficit for which the state must compensate, with social 
dependency the consequence (Townsend 1986: 21).  With increasing age people are 
pressurised to accept the implications of their diminishing worth.  Older adults who 
internalise ageist beliefs can behave as though they are no longer independent and healthy 
(Levy 2009).  Exposed to negative age sterotypes in laboratory studies, they demonstrated 
worse memory, handwriting and self-confidence and appeared to age instantly – moving in 
a stereotypically older manner (Meisner, 2012).  Such stereotype embodiment has been 
shown to decrease the mental health, well-being and will to live of older adults (Wurm and 
Benyamini 2104).  
 
Health and social care services routinely implement the decline ideology in their procedures, 
decision making and professional values, institutionalising age discrimination in all areas of 
service provision (Lloyd-Sherlock et al, 2015). Studies regularly document the established 
relationship between increasing age and the decreasing quality of health care received in 
secondary care (eg oncology, heart disease, neurology), primary care (eg osteoarthritis, 
screening) and mental health services (Clark 2009; Centre for Policy on Ageing 2009).  
Health professionals customarily discriminate on the basis of age.  For example, in the 
treatment of cardiovascular disease, a study found that 46 per cent of GPs and 49 per cent 
of cardiologists treated patients over 65 less well than those under 65 (Harries et al 2007).  
Behind the behaviour lies the attitude.  A survey of oncology healthcare professionals 
reported that regardless of gender, profession and clinical experience persistently negative 
attitudes were displayed towards elderly people (Kearney et al 2000).  In a survey of 870 
family and hospital doctors, one in three felt care should be limited on age grounds and that 
elderly patients should not be given free treatment if it were unlike ly to do them good for 
long (Donnelly 2008).  Such data fits readily with the hegemonic view that social value 
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declines with age, that health care rights of citizens should diminish accordingly and that the 
age-based rationing of health care supply is therefore rational and legitimate .  One 
prominent technical tool use by the National Institute for Health and Clinical Excellence 
(NICE) to judge the cost-effectiveness of health interventions in the NHS as a means for 
resource allocation, the QALY (Quality Adjusted Life Year), faithfully reflects and reinforces 
this philosophy.  The older you are the fewer the QALYs you are l ikely to generate, the 
smaller the value accrued from your treatment and therefore the less justification for 
investment in your health: a measure which Harris describes as ‘inherently ageist’ (Harris 
2005: 374).  Similarly in health research, clinical trials have routinely excluded older 
participants or those with comorbidities meaning that the drugs produced are often not 
able to be prescribed to older populations (see eg Rajapakse et al 2008).  Such is the power 
of the ideology that older patients frequently accept its logic and are prepared to self-ration 
in favour of younger people.  A survey of over-65s hypothetically about to receive cardiac 
surgery found that 37 per cent of respondents would be willing to swap places with a 
younger person six months behind on the waiting list (Bowling et al 2002).  Internalisation of 
a hegemony’s values by those it oppresses is a key indicator of hegemonic success.    
 
The emerging counter-hegemony 
Ensconced in the protective embrace of the blocco storico of pharmaceuticals, medicine and 
health care state, the hegemonic ideology of ageing promotes a continuum of social value 
where worth diminishes with advancing age.  Supply side driven by an expanding global 
economic dynamic, the hegemony appears secure.  How, then, has opposition emerged?   
Gramsci’s theory suggests that a counter-hegemony may be mobilised through a ‘war of 
position’ which ‘slowly builds up the strength of the social foundations of a new state’ by 
‘creating alternative institutions and alternative intellectual resources within existing 
society’ (Cox, 1983:165).  Ideologically based, the opposing forces are essentially cultural, 
driven by organic intellectuals who construct and organise a counter-hegemonic 
consciousness capable of sustaining an alternative reality to that promoted by the 
hegemony (Gramsci, 1971: 328-41).  The economic base, meanwhile, is seen to play little 
direct part in the hegemonic struggle.  The focus is on the nexus between civil society and 
state.  In contrast, the argument of this paper is that in the case of the hegemony of ageing 
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the economic base is central to an understanding of how opposition has arisen, an 




The objective of the blocco storico is to sustain and enhance the operation of the 
pharmaceutical market.  This it does.  Where it has problems is in the prevention of the 
emergence of other markets, not directly in competition with the pharmaceutical market, 
where the exercise of consumer demand over time generates an alternative ideology of 
ageing.  As Moran observes in his work on the health care state, ‘the impact of capitalist 
competition is destabilisation’ and ‘a constant source of disturbance to any momentary 
institutional equilibrium reached for the government of consumption, professions or 
production’ (Moran, 1999: 13).  What is the dynamic that has fuelled this destabilisation in 
the case of ageing? 
 
The hegemony of ageing assumes that economic decline will accompany political, social and 
cultural decline as an individual progressively moves to the margins of society.  The evidence 
of the last forty years suggests that the opposite has happened and that ageing is 
accompanied by the steady acquisition of economic resources:  resources that may be used 
to stimulate the emergence of new markets and new identities.  Forty years ago older 
people were regarded as among the poorer members of society with nearly half of 
pensioner households having an income below the poverty threshold of 60 per cent of 
median household income.  That has changed.  Today less than a quarter are below the 
poverty level (Metz and Underwood, 2005: 10).  Between 2004/05 and 2014/15, the 
proportion of retired households in the bottom quintile of UK median income decreased 
from 45.7 to 39.4 per cent and in the top quintile doubled from 6.1 to 12.6 per cent (Office 
for National Statistics (ONS), 2016).  Incomes of older people have risen relative to younger 
age groups, particularly since the economic downturn of 2007/08.  Since then the median 
income for retired households has increased in most years with the value rising to £21,000 
in 2014/15, £1,500 higher than in 2007/08. By contrast, the median income for non-retired 
households decreased and in 2014/15 was £28,300, around £900 below 2007/08 levels 
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(£29,200) (ONS, 2016).  The biggest factor stimulating this change has been the rise in the  
ability to exploit the private pensions and annuities markets to enhance retirement income.  
In 1977 the proportion of gross income received by retired households from private 
pensions was 18 per cent.  By 2014/15 this had risen to 43 per cent, significantly shifting 
both the structural basis of their income and their economic position relative to younger 
people (ONS, 2016).  In addition, people are generating a work-based income for longer.  
Employment participation rates for those beyond state pension age increased from 8 pe r 
cent to 11 per cent for males and 7 to 12 per cent for females between 1982 and 2008 
(Mayhew, 2009: 34). 
 
Similar large shifts have occurred in the amount of capital owned as age increases.  Drawing 
on data from the English Longitudinal Study of Ageing (ELSA) 2002-2012, Banks et al found 
that movement along the ageing continuum was accompanied by a greater likelihood of 
inheritances and greater expectations of future inheritances.  For example, of those born in 
the 1940s, 34 per cent had received an inheritance compared with 30 per cent born in the 
1930s and 22 per cent born in the 1920s.  The median value of inheritances received is 
£34,540 (2013 prices) (Banks et al, 2014: 16).  Meanwhile data from the earlier 2002 ELSA 
study showed that net financial wealth (accumulated savings plus inheritance, excluding 
housing) increases with age to reach a peak in the mid-60s before declining.  In 2003, 85 per 
cent of all such wealth, £560 billion, was reported to be owned by the over 50s (Marmot et 
al, 2003: Table 3A.7).  In 2015, research showed that retirees saved £48.7 billion per year 
(Brancati et al, 2015: 3). 
 
Despite the overall increase in the relative wealth of older people, clearly large inequalities 
remain within the group itself.  There are still 1.6 million (14 per cent) of pensioners living in 
poverty (with incomes of less than 60 per cent of typical household income after housing 
costs) of whom 900,000 are in severe poverty (incomes less than half of typical household 
income) (Age UK, 2016). Some pensioner groups are at greater risk than others.  Ethnicity is 
important: 27 per cent of Asian or Asian British and 24 per cent of Black or Black British are 
in poverty (Department of Work and Pensions, 2015.  See also Bajekla et al, 2004; Moriarty 
and Butt, 2004).  Indeed, the latest Office for National Statistics report on household income 
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and inequality observes that there is evidence that inequality rose for retired households 
but fell for non-retired households in recent years (Office for National Statistics, 2017: 
section 9).  The implication of these income inequalities for the market is that ‘there is no 
such thing as “the older consumer”’ but rather a diversity of older consumer groups with 
quite different patterns of expenditure ’ (Brancatti et al, 2015: 29).   
 
With increased income and capital comes market power: the capacity to influence existing 
markets and create new ones through changing patterns of expenditure .  As consumers 
move along the latter stages of the age continuum, so they feel less limited in their market 
choices.  Retired people are ‘less constrained by money shortages than those who are not 
retired’: 77.9 per cent said that they never or rarely had too little money for their needs 
compared to only 59.7 per cent of those not retired (Brancati et al, 2015: 39).  The market 
significance of the relationship between age and increasing wealth is enhanced by weight of 
numbers.  Older people constitute a growing proportion of a growing UK population with 
the over 65s rising from 15% in 1984 to a projected 20% in 2024 (ONS, 2016: Table 4).  Life 
expectancy at birth in the UK has consistently increased, from 70.8 years for males and 76.8 
years for females in 1980-1982 to 78.9 years for males and to 82.7 years for females in 
2011-2013.  Bearing in mind the rise in the UK population from 56.4 million to 64.4 million in 
the 1984-2014 period, these are significant figures with the over-65 population rising from 
8.64 million to 11.59 million. 
 
The impact of these structural changes in the economic base i s that the older consumer 
market is large and growing.  People over 50 account for 80 per cent of national wealth and 
nearly 40 per cent of annual consumer spending (HM Government, 2009: 14).  Meanwhile 
the over-60s market is forecast to grow by 81 per cent from 2005 to 2030, but the 18–59 
market by only 7 per cent (Age UK, 2010: 4).  Analysis by the Personal Finance Research 
Centre at Bristol University finds that the 65-plus age group accounts for 20 per cent of the 
UK consumer population (16-plus), and is expected to rise, so that in 2030 over-65s will 





Ideology and legitimation 
However, as Gramsci would point out, the translation of changes in the economic base of 
ageing into a challenge to the hegemony of ageing requires an accompanying cultural shift 
in values to explain and legitimate the nature of the challenge.  Merely because economic 
capacity increases with age does not mean that this capacity will be employed through 
market choice to forge a new social identity at odds with the prescriptions of the hegemony.   
It may simply be used to expand markets which reinforce the hegemony of decline.   Indeed, 
this is the more likely option, Gramsci suggests, unless a group of organic intellectuals 
actively intervene to construct an ideology supportive of the potential changes in the 
economic base (Gramsci, 1971:328-41).  How informative is this theoretical prediction in the 
case of ageing? 
 
That cultural change associated with the role of older consumers has occurred is not in 
doubt.  Research strongly suggests that through its proactive approach to the market the 
post-war generation has become ‘constitutive of the rise of modern consumerism’ 
(Edmunds and Turner, 2002: 4) and characterised by a ‘generational habitus of 
consumption’ (Higgs et al : 2007).  Accustomed to the life choices provided by affluence, the 
‘baby boomers’ in particular have routinised the construction of identity through lifestyle 
consumption so that the workplace (and its absence following retirement) is a much 
reduced influence (Harking and Huber, 2004).  In so doing, it is claimed, the baby boom 
generation ‘broke the mould of the modern life course’  (Gilleard and Higgs, 2002: 376), 
rejecting the passivity of previous generations in favour of an active and individualised 
approach to social identity (Gilleard and Higgs, 2000: 84).   
 
Such an approach to ageing is characteristic of the postmodern which ‘involves a shift in 
patterns of differentiation from the social to the cultural sphere, from life chances to life 
styles, from production to consumption’.  As a consequence, ‘status will not depend on 
one’s location in the society, especially its system of production and reproduction but on 
one’s status accomplishments in the sphere of consumption’ (Crook et al, 1992: 133).  It 
leads to the view of a ‘third age’ advanced by Laslett in A fresh map of life (1989) and Young 
and Schuller in Life after work (1991) where ‘the agentic construction of a life world’ is 
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achieved through a search for a ‘post-working-life’ identity, independent of both the state 
and the productive processes, and the reacquisition of social and cultural capital (Gilleard 
and Higgs, 2000: 38-40).  Whilst British scholars see the third age as a vehicle for enhanced 
citizenship, in the US the interpretation of the same phenomenon places greater emphasis 
on the possibilities for personal identity through lifestyle choice (see e.g. Sheehy, 1996).   
What is common to both, and what others have explored through the concept of ‘active 
ageing’, is the view of ageing as a voyage guided by positive choices rather than a passive 
response to society’s definition of ageing (Davey, 2002; Clarke and Warren, 2007).  There is 
of course a ‘fourth age’ where the foundational aspects  of ageing manifest as disability and 
death may become inescapable, but this does not detract from the counter-hegemonic 
significance of the third age (Gilleard and Higgs, 200: 197-199). 
 
To this upbeat view of ageing as lifestyle choice can be added the political dimension where, 
as citizens, older people are prepared to be as proactive in expressing their demand for 
political products as they are as consumers for economic goods. The ‘grey vote’ has become 
the political equivalent of the ‘grey pound’, reinforcing the cultural shift from passivity to 
self-promotion.  The voting power of older people is now structurally embedded in the 
British electoral system with increasing age positively related to voter turnout and the 
strength of the relationship itself increasing over time (CIPFA, 2015).  Bearing in mind that 
older people are also an increasing proportion of the population, the responsiveness of 
politicians to their interests and policy demands is an established feature of British politics.  
Witness for example the attention given by David Cameron to the ‘triple lock’ policy on the 
state pension (increases to be by the rate of inflation, average earnings or 2.5 per cent, 
whichever is the higher) and his promise to ringfence all universal pensioner benefits such 
as the winter fuel allowance, free bus passes and free TV licences in the run up to the 2015 
election.  Witness also what happened when Teresa May, having called an election in June 
2017, was forced into an ignominious retreat following her short-lived advocacy of a ‘double 
lock’ in the 2017 Conservative Manifesto (Conservative Party, 2017: 64).   With Labour 
maintaining support for the triple lock in its manifesto, guaranteeing the winter fuel 
allowance and free bus passes, promising to ‘extend Pension Credit to hundreds of 
thousands of the most vulnerable women’,  and claiming that the Conservatives were about 
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to ‘abandon their commitment to older people’ (Labour Party, 2017:  54), the Conservatives 
found a key component of their core support base dangerously exposed and soon recanted. 
.Such a combination of consumer and citizen muscle aligned in a common counter-
hegemonic project suggests the emergence of an important cultural shift.  But where are 
the organic intellectuals to articulate and legitimate it? 
 
The absence of such a group points to a new phenomenon outside the conventional 
expectations of the Gramscian approach.  Rather than an institutionally located vehicle for 
the production of new values, what we appear to have is a more diffuse situation where the 
availability of, and engagement with, market opportunities itself stimulates a counter-
hegemonic movement (see the parallel example of health consumers in the field of stem cell 
treatments – Salter et al, 2015).  This takes us away from the static assumptions of a defined 
group of intellectual experts as expressed by Gramsci:  ‘All men are intellectuals, one could 
therefore say: but not all men have in society the function of intellectuals’ (Gramsci, 
1971:9).  And towards one where, through market interaction in an information rich society, 
all people may indeed have the function of intellectuals through their individual reflection 
on, and application of, consumerist values in a particular field to produce changed social 
relations.  Social and cultural capital can be maintained and, indeed, enhanced through the 
exercise of agentic spontaneity in the cultivation of new forms of identity via market 
choices. 
 
Successful hegemonies are those capable of recognising, responding to and, if necessary, 
accommodating the challenge from rising power groups (Germain and Kenny, 1998). In so 
doing, they engage in what Gramsci terms trasformismo: ‘a strategy of assimilating and 
domesticating potentially dangerous ideas by adjusting them to the policies of the  dominant 
coalition’ (Cox, 1983: 166-7). Certainly the state-sponsored hegemony has responded to the 
challenge of an ideology of ageing based on a narrative of choice and individual 
empowerment.  From the early 2000s onwards, parts of the state showed some public 
awareness of the market significance of the economic shifts documented in the preceding 
section.  In 2000 the Ageing Population Panel of the Foresight exercise outlined the market 
opportunities created by older consumers in financial products, health care, preventive 
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technology, IT and communications, housing and, particularly leisure  and the need for 
businesses ‘to ditch outdated stereotypes about older consumers and focus on the grey 
pound’ (Department of Trade and Industry, 2000: 23).  Subsequent reports such as the 
Department of Work and Pensions’ Opportunity age (2005) and Building a society for all 
ages (2009), the Audit Commission’s Older people: independence and well being (2002) and 
the House of Lords Select Committee on Economic Affairs’ report Aspects of the Economics 
of an Ageing Population (2005) develop these themes further.  As authoritative statements 
by government bodies, the reports constitute official recognition of the market pressures on 
the hegemonic assumptions of age and powerlessness and the need for the adaptation of 
the established decline ideology.  
 
In the main, the exercise in trasformismo has been led by the public health profession.  Its 
task has been to balance recognition of the validity of the oppositional principles of 
consumerism and choice with the interest of the blocco storico in maintaining the growth of 
the pharmaceutical industry and the power of medicine .  Central to this task has been the 
advancement of what has become known as ‘the new public health’ characterised by the 
promulgation of policies commonly grouped together as ‘health promotion’ aimed at the 
changing of individual behaviour (Petersen and Lupton, 1996).  Defined by the WHO’s 
seminal Ottawa Charter as the ‘the process of enabling people to increase control over, and 
to improve, their health’ (WHO 1986), health promotion embraces ‘empowerment’ of the 
population as a central part of its credo.  Influenced by the social gerontology literature on 
agency, identity and the third age, WHO’s ageing empowerment narrative has employed the 
concept of ‘active ageing’ as its primary vehicle .  Its reports Active ageing: a policy 
framework (2002), Political declaration and Madrid international plan of action on ageing 
(2002), and the World report on ageing and health (2015) argued that active ageing should 
be characterised by ‘the process of optimising opportunities for health’ through the exercise 
of choice in the adoption of a ‘flexible life course’  (WHO, 2015: 5).  If empowerment through 
choice is so valued, the political tension then centres on the question of how ‘health 
promotion [can] both promote individual choice and at the same time convince individuals 
that the experts know best’ (Dew, 2012: 53).  For the hegemony, the answer is simple: 
health consumer choice should take place within a saturated information environment 
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provided by public health professionals: one designed to steer consumer choice in directions 
that either support or do not challenge the hegemonic interest.  The promulgation of a risk 
discourse is a key part of this strategy of control through individual self-regulation. 
 
The ‘factors of risk’ they [health promoters] identify are distributed throughout the 
social body to the extent that (responsible) individuals at every turn face the task of 
having to monitor, regulate and change (that is, refashion) themselves to avoid, 
modify, control and eliminate behaviours and situations deemed ‘risky’ (Petersen 
and Lupton, 1996: 20). 
 
In the UK, the example of the 2010 White Paper Healthy Lives, Healthy People. Our strategy 
for public health in England neatly encapsulates the dualism inherent in the application of 
trasformismo to ‘active ageing’.  On the one hand, it bravely asserts that ‘it is simply not 
possible to promote healthier lifestyles through Whitehall diktat and nannying about the 
way people should live’ and that ‘We need a new approach that empowers individuals to 
make healthy choices’ (HM Government, 2010: 2,).  On the other, ‘central action’ is 
necessary using ‘approaches that focus on enabl ing and guiding people’s choices wherever 
possible’, ‘changing social norms and default options so that healthier choices are easier for 
people to make’ and ‘nudging people in the right direction’  (HM Government, 2010: 30).  As 
a result, the White Paper is confident that ‘by using the latest thinking from behavioural 
science, communities can be better designed to enable active ageing to become the norm 
rather than the exception’ (HM Government, 2010: 47).  Through such measures, the 
objective of empowerment becomes ‘obliging people to make the appropriate choices as 
determined by health experts’ (Dew, 2012: 51).   
 
Although some health promotion activities are likely to result in choices that reduce the 
demand for drugs, others, assisted by the public health profession, will produce choices that 
increase it.  In particular, the ever-expanding risk discourse of preventive medicine provides 
a natural platform for the launching of new drug treatments for a healthy population.  
Indeed, that is where major new pharmaceutical markets lie.  Heath observes that ‘As the 
overall health of a population increases, more money can be made from selling healthcare 
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interventions for the healthy majority than for the sick minority ’ (Heath, 2005: 954).  As a 
result, in developed countries, more resources are now invested in research into the 
prevention of disease than into its treatment (Freemantle and Hill, 2002).  An increasingly 
common tactic is to present a risk factor as a disease.  Referring to the examples of blood 
pressure and osteopenia, Freemantle and Hill reflect: 
 
It is always difficult to draw a line and dichotomise a continuous variable into normal 
and abnormal categories, but it is in the interests of the pharmaceutical industry to 
draw a line that includes as large a population as possible within the range of 
abnormality. But is it in the interests of the rest of us, either as patients or as 
citizens?  (Freemantle and Hill, 2002: 865) 
 
What remains unresolved is how far this pharmaceutical momentum will be maintained 
and, even if it is, successful hegemonic adaptation achieved.  As the endless debates about 
statins amply illustrate, the vast information reserves of the internet continually produce 




The politics of ageing is therefore at an interesting juncture with the twin dynamics of 
hegemony and counter-hegemony finely balanced.  As yet there is no indication that the 
blocco storico of the pharmaceutical industry, medicine and state has been seriously 
destabilised by the changing economic base of ageing, the impact of the market in enabling 
the lifestyle choices of older health consumers, and the sensitivity of the state to the 
expansion of their electoral power.  The consumption of drugs continues to increase with 
age and the medical profession is assiduous in promoting and justifying exciting new 
pharmaceuticalised definitions of well-being.  The hegemonic ageist rhetoric of declining 
social value, scapegoating and deviancy is still an acceptable feature of broadsheet 
journalism with Paxman (67), for example, arguing for the removal of the vote for the over 




Some scarcely know what day of the week it is, yet their ballot papers are worth the 
same as a Cambridge professor’s. And politicians know that older pe ople are much 
more likely to vote — as one put it to me privately, ‘there’s not much else going on 
in lots of their lives’. (Paxman, 2015). 
 
Acceptable perhaps, but no longer secure as the popular expression of the hegemonic 
ideology of ageing. 
 
The challenge has come from a direction not anticipated by Gramscian theory.  Instead of an 
oppositional discourse developed by a particular group of organic intellectuals to exploit 
changes in the economic base, we find a much more diffuse phenomenon characterised by 
broad consumerist values of opportunity and choice linked to the expression of new forms 
of market demand as vehicles for the maintenance and creation of social and cultural capital 
through agentic spontaneity.  It has been a sluggish process not least because potential 
markets, governed as they were by the youth-oriented values of the hegemony, have been 
slow to respond to the reformulation of ageing identities inherent in the emergence of the 
new demand (Metz and Underwood, 2004).  Nonetheless, that challenge is now established, 
generating the very visible political tensions associated with such issues as intergenerational 
justice, voting power and welfare support where offence is most easily given to the 
ideological assumptions of decline.  The issue of intergenerational justice in particular, for 
some time labelled as ‘victim blaming’ (Minkler, 1991), has since Brexit, generated a 
commission to review issues of fairness and sustainability (Gardiner, 2016; Bangham, Finch 
& Phillips, 2018). The supply-side driven hegemony of the blocco storico remains intact, but 
it is obliged to recognise that its demand-side component is no longer so accepting of the 
ageing trajectory, nor wholly guided by the benign authority of the medical profession.   
Institutionalised ageism remains a core feature of welfare provision, particularly in the 
health service, but its supporting ideology is no longer fully sovereign. 
 
Given the embedded economic base of the hegemony and the expanding market power of 
the counter-hegemony, the most likely scenario in the near future is the co-existence of 
both dynamics with periodic ideological conflict around particular issues.  Neither has the 
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ideological power to eliminate the other and neither, in a sense, needs to so long as both 
can gain economic benefits from the latter stages of the age continuum. Although the 
exercise in trasformismo through the good offices of the new public health appears to lend 
the hegemony the initiative in terms of the state-sponsored empowerment of ‘active 
ageing’ within professionally defined limits  which include preventive medicine, it is not at 
all clear that self-directed health improvement will remain a controllable phenomenon in an 
age of internet-driven opportunity. It may simply legitimise and enhance the counter-
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